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VOLUNTARY PAYMENTS TO WIDOWS OF CORPORATE 
EXECUTIVES: GIFTS OR INCOME? 
The solicitude of hardhearted corporations for the widows of corporate 
executives has given rise to an abundance of cases involving the question 
whether payments to these widows constitute gifts or income. In the cases to 
be considered in this comment, payments are made by the corporation to the 
decedent's widow on a purely voluntary basis. In the typical situation, the 
board of directors adopts a resolution eulogizing the decedent and authoriz-
ing payments to his widow in recognition of his long and faithful service.1 
In most cases, these payments ;µ-e measured by the decedent's salary and 
continue for periods ranging from a few months to a few years. The Com-
missioner of I:p.ternal Revenue relies upon section 6l(a)2 and claims that 
the widow's receipts constitute taxable income. The widow insists that she 
has received a gift which may be excluded from gross income under section 
102(a).3 
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Commissioner v. Duberstein,-t 
the Commissioner met with little success in his attempts to tax these pay-
ments. Since Duberstein, however, the courts have widely disagreed. By 
tracing the development of the widow payment phase of the gift-income 
controversy and by delineating possible solutions to the problems which 
· presently exist, it is hoped that guidelines will be provided for remedial 
action by either C~ngress or the courts. 
I. THE PRE-DUBERSTEIN ERA 
The first case of major significance in the gift-income area did not arise 
until 1937, when the Supreme Court handed down its decision in Bogardus 
v. Commissioner.5 Although not dealing with payments to widows of cor-
porate executives, this case has had a significant influence on the develop-
ment of the tax treatment of such payments. The J)ogardus case involved 
payments made by Corporation A to petitioner and others who had ren-
dered services to Corporation B. In January 1931, all of B's stock was sold, 
but prior to the sale, A was organized and purchased some of B's assets. All 
of B's former stockholders became stockholders of A with the same propor-
tionate holdings. A few days after the sale, the stockholders of A proposed 
that they show their appreciation for the loyalty and support of some of the 
employees of B by making a "gift or honorarium." A resolution to that 
1 For examples of typical resolutions, see Reed v. United States, 177 F. Supp. 205, 
206 (W.D. Ky. 1959), afj'd mem., 277 F.2d 456 (6th Cir. 1960); Roy I. Martin, 36 T.C. 556, 
557-58 (1961), afj'd, 305 F.2d 290 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 904 (1962); Estate of John 
A. Maycann, Sr., 29 T.C. 81, 83 (1957), appeal dismissed per stipulation, (6th Cir. 1958). 
2 INT. RF: •• CoDE OF 1954, § 6l(a). "Except as otherwise provided in this subtitle, gross 
income means all income from whatever source derived •••. " 
3 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 102(a). "Gross income does not include the value of 
property acquired by ~ft, bequest, devise, or inheritance." 
4 363 U.S. 278 (1960). 
5 302 U.S. 34 (1937). 
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effect was adopted by A's board of directors and ratified by its stockholders. 
Pursuant to the resolution, payments were made to present and former 
employees, attorneys, and experts of B, none of whom had ever been in the 
employ of A. The Commissioner held that the payments were part of peti-
tioner's gross income. The Board of Tax Appeals sustained this determina-
tion and the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed.6 
The Supreme Court, four Justices dissenting,7 reversed the decision of 
the Second Circuit and held that the payment to petitioner was a gift. Both 
the majority and the dissenters agreed as to the determinative factor which 
distinguishes gifts from income. In the language of the dissent: "What con-
trols is not the presence or absence of consideration. What controls is the 
intention with which payment, however voluntary, has been made."8 In-
dicative of the reasoning of the Court are the following excerpts from the 
majority opinion: 
"Neither the Unopco company [corporation A] nor anyone else was 
under any obligation, legal or otherwise, to pay any of the recipients, 
including petitioner, any salary, compensation or consideration of any 
kind .... [T]he disbursements were not made or intended to be made 
for any services rendered or to be rendered or for any consideration 
given or to be given . . . . There is entirely lacking the constraining 
force of any moral or legal duty as well as the incentive of anticipated 
benefit of any kind beyond the satisfaction which flows from the per-
formance of a generous act. . • ."9 
"A gift is none the less a gift because inspired by gratitude for the past 
faithful service of the recipient."10 
Agreeing that the intent of the transferor is the crucial element in dis-
tinguishing gifts from income, the members of the Court disagreed as to 
whether they were reviewing a question of law or of fact. The majority 
held that the question is one of law, or at least a mixed question of law 
and fact,11 and that as a result, the determination of the Board was subject 
to a broad review. The decision was reversed because, as a matter of law, 
the inferences drawn by the lower court were incorrect because of failure 
to find the intent to make a gift. The four dissenters felt that the question 
was purely factual and that reversal was precluded because the inferences 
drawn by the Board were not clearly erroneous.12 
Prior to the decision in Bogardus, the Commissioner had issued two 
rulings dealing with payments to widows.13 These provided that in in-
6 Bogardus v. Helvering, 88 F.2d 646 (2d Cir. 1937). 
7 Justices Brandeis, Stone, Cardozo, and Black. 
s Bogardus v. Commissioner, 302 U.S. 34, 45 (1937). 
9 Id. at 41. 
10 Id. at 44. 
11 Id. at 38-39. 
12 Id. at 45. 
18 0.D. 1017, 5 CuM. BULL. 101 (1921); T.D. 2090, 16 TREAS. DEC. INT. REv. 259, 267-68 
(1914). 
1218 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62 
stances in which the monthly salary of an officer or employee was paid for 
a limited period after his death to his widow in recognition of services ren-
dered by him, the payments would not he treated as taxable income to the 
widow if she had rendered no services to the corporation. These rulings 
also provided that the payments were not a deductible business expense 
to the corporation. In 1939, two years after the Bogardus decision, the Com-
missioner issued I.T. 3329.14 In accordance with his prior rulings, he stated 
that the payments were gifts excludahle from the recipient's gross income, 
hut for the first time he ruled that the payments were deductible by the 
corporation as a business expense. 
The tax saving possibilities inherent in I.T. 3329 and in the broad 
language used in Bogardus probably brought forth an increasing number of 
voluntary payments to widows of corporate executives. In any event, the 
number of litigated cases involving these payments increased, and the Com-
missioner felt obliged to change his position. In 1950, he issued I.T. 4027, 
applicable to payments received on or after January 1, 1951: 
"[T]he essential factor is whether services were rendered to the em-
ployer, not .•. whether services were rendered by the recipient • ... It 
is the position of the Bureau that irrespective of a 'plan,' voluntary 
or involuntary, definite or indefinite, payments of the type herein con-
sidered constitute taxable income, and it is held that payments made 
by an employer to the widow of a deceased officer or employee, in con-
sideration of services rendered by the officer or employee, are includihle 
in the gross income of the widow for Federal income tax purposes."15 
The strict position taken by the Commissioner in I.T. 4027 did not 
gain the acceptance of the courts. Initially, the Tax Court chose to ignore 
the ruling. In the first three cases before it which involved payments made 
after January l, 1951, it found nontaxable gifts without even mentioning 
the Commissioner's ruling.16 In Estate of Arthur W. Hellstrom,17 the Tax 
Court finally acknowledged the existence of I.T. 4027, but expressly re-
jected the position the Commissioner had taken. Mr. Hellstrom had been 
a minority stockholder, director, and president of Hellstrom Corporation. 
After his death on February 20, 1952, in recognition of services rendered 
by him, the corporation, though under no obligation to do so, paid his 
widow his monthly salary to the end of the year. The Tax Court, in hold-
ing that the payments were gifts, disposed of I.T. 4027 in one short sentence: 
"The respondent, obviously, cannot by administrative ruling tax as ordinary 
income a payment which the payor made and intended as a gift."18 The 
14 I.T. 3329, 1939-2 CUM. BULL. 153. 
15 I.T. 4027, 1950-2 CuM. BULL. 9, 10-ll, revoking O.D. 1017, 5 CuM. BULL. 101 (1921), 
revoking T .D. 2090, 16 TREAS. DEC. INT. REv. 259, 267-68 (1914), modifying I.T. 3329, 1939-2 
CuM. BuLL. 153. (Emphasis added.) 
16 Marie G. Haskell, 24 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 661 (1955); Estate of Ralph W. Reardon, 
24 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 482 (1955); Ruth Hahn, 23 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 366 (1954). 
17 24 T.C. 916 (1955). 
18 Id. at 919. 
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court attached no particular significance to the fact that the amount paid 
to the widow was deducted by the corporation on its tax return or to the 
fact that the payments were in effect a continuation of the decedent's salary. 
However, the court did cite the following as "controlling facts" in estab-
lishing the intent to make a gift: 
I. The payment was made to the widow rather than to her husband's 
estate. 
2. The corporation was under no obligation to pay additional com-
pensation to the husband. 
3. The corporation derived no benefit from the payments. 
4. The widow performed no services for the corporation. 
5. The services of the husband had been fully compensated.19 
In the years between the Tax Court's decision in Hellstrom and the 
Supreme Court's decision in Duberstein, both the district courts and the 
Tax Court employed the same criteria in deciding the many widow payment 
cases that came before them. Heavy reliance was placed upon the five factors 
set forth in Hellstrom and upon recent decisions in factually similar cases. 
In addition to being heavily weighted in favor of a finding of gift, the five-
factor test was interpreted quite liberally in favor of the widow.2° For ex-
ample, in considering the question of whether the corporation derived any 
benefit from the payments, the courts consistently ignored the possibility 
of indirect benefits such as the creation of good will or the development of 
a sense of loyalty and security in officers and executives. The result was a 
great number of Tax Court21 and district court22 cases which, in the ab-
sence of unusual circumstances, were decided in the widow's favor.23 
Before considering the Duberstein case and the ensuing confusion, one 
statutory development must be noted. Prior to the adoption of the Revenue 
Act of 1951, there were no statutory provisions in the Code dealing directly 
with death benefits paid by employers. Decisions in cases which excluded 
from gross income payments made upon the death of an employee were 
based solely upon the provisions of the Code pertaining to gifts.24 In 1951, 
19 Id. at 920. 
20 See Florence E. Carr, 28 T.C. 779 (1957) (nontaxable gift despite contractual obli-
gation to pay); Estate of Frank J. Foote, 28 T.C. 547 (1957) (nontaxable gift despite payment 
to husband's estate). 
21 See cases collected in Note, 49 VA. L. REv. 74, 86-87 n.58. Contra, Ruth T. Lengsfield, 
24 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 860 (1955), afj'd, 241 F.2d 508 (5th Cir. 1957) (closely held corporation; 
payments were dividends). 
22 See cases collected in Note, 49 VA. L. REv. 74, 87 n.59. 
23 Due to these adverse court decisions, the Commissioner issued a ruling holding that 
the Internal Revenue Service would no longer litigate cases arising under the 1939 Code 
involving the taxability of voluntary payments to widows by their deceased husbands' 
employers unless there was clear evidence that the payments were intended as compensa-
tion or could be considered as dividends. Rev. Rul. 58-613, 1958-2 CUM. BuLL. 914. 
24 Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 22(b){3) (now INT. REv. CoDJ,: OF 1954, § 102(a)): "The 
following items shall not be included in gross income and shall be exempt from taxation 
under this chapter: • • • The value of property acquired by gift, bequest, devise, or 
inheritance." 
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section 22(b)(l), which related to the taxation of the proceeds of life in-
surance, was amended to provide a 5,000-dollar exclusion for payments by 
an employer to the beneficiaries of a deceased employee, if made pursuant 
to a contract and paid by reason of the death of the employee.2:1 Section 
IOI(b) of the 1954 Code eliminated the requirement that the payments be 
made pursuant to a contract.26 The Commissioner later seized upon this 
provision as a solution to the problem of determining the tax treatment of 
widow payments. He took the position that since payments to widows are 
employee death benefits, they are fully controlled by section IOI(b) and, in 
considering their tax treatment, the gift exclusion provisions of section 
102(a) are completely irrelevant.27 It was his contention that congressional 
intent was to compromise the extremes of complete taxation and complete 
exclusion by excluding up to 5,000 dollars of such payments and including 
in gross income all amounts received above 5,000 dollars. 
Those opposing the Commissioner's position argued that the 5,000-
dollar limitation applies only to payments which can not be classified as gifts 
subject to full exclusion from gross income under section 102(a). They 
pointed out that under the 1939 Code, death benefits pursuant to contract 
qualified for the 5,000-dollar exclusion, gifts were fully excluded from gross 
income, and non-contractual obligations which did not qualify as gifts were 
fully taxed. It was their contention that the changes in the law were designed 
to extend the exclusion to non-contractual, non-gift payments rather than to 
encroach upon the tax-free status of gifts. In support of this position, they 
cited the legislative history, which indicated that Congress intended to 
liberalize, rather than to restrict, the benefits of the 5,000-dollar exclusion 
provision.28 
25 Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 22(b)(I). The purpose of the amendment was to equalize 
the tax. treatment of the proceeds of a life insurance contract paid upon the death of an 
employee and payments directly from the employer under the same circumstances. Pelisek, 
Tax Treatment of Payments to the Widows of Corporate Officers and Employees, 44 MARQ. 
L. REv. 16 (1960). 
26 INT. REV. CoDE of 1954, § IOl(b): 
"(b) EMPLOYEES' DEATH BENEFITS,-
(!) GENERAL RULE.-Gross income does not include amounts received (whether 
in a single sum or otherwise) by the beneficiaries or the estate of an employee, if 
such amounts are paid by or on behalf of an employer and are paid by reason of 
the death of the employee. 
(2) SPECIAL RULES FOR PARAGRAPH (1).-
(A) $5,000 LIMITATION.-The aggregate amounts excludable under para-
graph (I) with respect to the death of any employee shall not exceed 
$5,000 ..•. " 
27 Rev. Rul. 60-326, 1960-2 CuM. Buu. 32. 
28 H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1954). "Present law provides a special 
exclusion of up to $5,000 for payments by an employer to beneficiaries of a deceased em-
ployee. Under existing law, however, this exclusion is available only where the employer is 
under a contractual obligation to pay the death benefits ..•• Restricting the exemption 
to benefits paid under a contract discriminates against those who receive benefits where 
this contractual obligation docs not exist. To avoid this problem your committee's bill 
extends this exclusion to death benefits whether or not paid under a contract." See 
generally Crown, Payments to Corporate Executives' Widows, N.Y.U. 19th INST. ON FED. 
TAX. 815, 828-36 (1961); Diehl, Payments to Widows of Corporate Employees: Recent Cases 
and Rulings, U. So. CAL. 1960 TAX INST. 491, 504-09; Pelisek, supra note 25, at 28-32. 
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Dicta in two cases decided under the 1939 Code supported the Com-
missioner's interpretation.29 However, in cases in which the question was 
squarely in issue, his position was consistently rejected.3° Consequently, in 
1962, the Commissioner announced that he would no longer contend that 
section IOl(b) controls the taxability of payments to the widow of a de-
ceased executive when the payment otherwise qualifies as a gift fully ex-
cludable under section 102(a).31 In other words, section IOl(b) has settled 
the conflict over the tax treatment of voluntary payments to widows up to 
5,000 dollars, but, above that amount, the gift-income controversy still 
rages. 
II. THE DUBERSTEIN TRILOGY 
On June 13, 1960, decisions were handed down in three cases that had 
been argued together before the Supreme Court.32 In issue, in each of these 
cases, was the question whether certain payments made to the taxpayers were 
excludable from gross income as gifts. Despite the fact that none of these 
cases involved corporate payments to executives' widows, the Supreme 
Court's decisions in these cases have had a profound effect upon later de-
cisions involving payments to widows. Prior to June 13, 1960, the Com-
missioner had rarely succeeded in his attempts to tax these payments. Since 
that date, the courts have disagreed and the Commissioner has tasted victory 
on numerous occasions. 
In Duberstein, the taxpayer supplied the names of potential customers 
to the president of a corporation whom he had known personally for a 
number of years. The information proved valuable and, despite the tax-
payer's protests that he had not intended to be compensated, he was pre-
sented with a Cadillac. In Stanton v. United States, the taxpayer resigned 
as comptroller of a church corporation and as president of its wholly 
owned subsidiary, created to manage its extensive real estate holdings. 
Shortly thereafter, he was given a gratuity of 20,000 dollars in appreciation 
of his past services. In United States v. Kaiser, a labor union furnished 
strike assistance in the form of room rent and food vouchers to the taxpayer, 
29 Bounds v. United States, 262 F.2d 876, 878-79 n.2 (4th Cir. 1958); Rodner v. United 
States, 149 F. Supp. 233, 237 (S.D.N.Y. 1957). "In the complete revision effected by the 1954 
Code the general language exempting gifts is controlled by the particular language of 
section IOl(b) limiting the exemption of death benefits to $5,000. Gifts in general are 
exempt but gifts in the form of death benefits are taxable insofar as they exceed $5,000." 
Id. at 237. 
30 Rice v. United States, 197 F. Supp. 223, 227 (E.D. Wis. 1961); Wilner v. United 
States, 195 F. Supp. 786, 788-89 (S.D.N.Y. 1961); Frankel v. United States, 192 F. Supp. 776, 
777-78 (D. Minn. 1961), aff'd, 302 F.2d 666 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 903 (1962); Cowan 
v. United States, 191 F. Supp. 703, 705 (N.D. Ga. 1960); Reed v. United States, 177 F. Supp. 
205,209 (W.D. Ky. 1959), aff'd mem., 277 F.2d 456 (6th Cir. 1960). 
31 Rev. Rul. 62-102, 1962-2 CuM. BuLL. 37, modifying Rev. Rul. 60-326, 1960-2 CuM. 
BULL. 32. 
32 Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278 (1960) (also deciding Stanton v. United 
States); United States v. Kaiser, 363 U.S. 299 (1960). 
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a striking employee who was not a member of the union. The payments 
were made to strikers on a need basis without regard to union membership 
or participation in picketing or other activity in furtherance of the strike. 
In each of these cases, the taxpayer did not include the payment in his 
gross income and the Commissioner assessed a deficiency. The Supreme 
Court reversed the decision of the Sixth Circuit in Duberstein,83 thus sus-
taining the Tax Court's holding that the Cadillac was not a gift. In 
Stanton,34 the Supreme Court considered the findings of fact inadequate. 
Therefore, the Second Circuit's judgment reversing the district court's find-
ing in favor of the church executive was vacated and the case was remanded. 
In Kaiser,35 the Court affirmed, thus sustaining the jury's finding that the 
strike benefits were not taxable. 
The Duberstein trilogy was decided by a divided Court with only four 
Justices joining in the opinion of the Court.36 Yet, despite the lack of 
majority support, the Duberstein opinion has been heavily relied upon in 
subsequent cases because of its extensive discussion of the meaning of the 
term "gift" as used in the federal income tax statute and because of its 
holding that the distinction beween gift and income is a question of fact. 
In the Duberstein trilogy, the Government proposed a new test to dis-
tinguish gifts from income. The proposal defined gifts as "transfers of prop-
erty made for personal as distinguished from business reasons,"87 and its 
major corollary was that there could be no such thing as a corporate pay-
ment which could qualify both as an ordinary and necessary business ex-
pense to the corporation and as a gift to the recipient.88 In expressly 
rejecting both this test and its corollary, the Court pointed out that general 
principles for distinguishing gifts from income had already been established 
by its prior decisions and that the statutory framework does not lend itself 
to more definitive rules.39 The Court further indicated that rephrasing the 
test in terms of "motive" rather than "intention" would be a change with 
no practical significance. 40 
While citing a number of its previous opinions, the Court established a 
number of general principles. Since the federal income tax statute does not 
use the term "gift" in the common-law sense, voluntary transfers without 
consideration and transfers made in the absence of any legal or moral ob-
33 363 U.S. 278 (1960), reversing 265 F.2d 28 (6th Cir. 1959), reversing 27 P-H Tax Ct. 
Mem. 13 (1958). 
34 363 U.S. 278 (1960), vacating and remanding 268 F.2d 727 (2d Cir. 1959), reversing 
an unreported district court judgment in which the findings of fact and conclusions of law 
were made orally. 
35 363 U.S. 299 (1960), affirming 262 F.2d 367 (7th Cir. 1958), reversing 158 F. Supp. 
865 (E.D. Wis. 1957) (judgment n.o.v.). 
36 Justices Brennan, Black, and Clark and Chief Justice Warren. Duberstein was 
decided by an eight-to-one vote, Stanton by a five-to-four vote and Kaiser by a six-to-three 
vote. 
37 Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 284 n.6 (1960). 
38 Id. at 288. 
39 Id. at 284-85. 
40 Id. at 286. 
1964] COMMENTS 1223 
ligation are not necessarily gifts.41 However, "if the payment proceeds 
primarily from 'the constraining force of any moral or legal duty,' or from 
'the incentive of anticipated benefit' of an economic nature, ... it is not a 
gift,"42 and if the payment is in return for services rendered, it is not a gift, 
even if the donor derives no economic benefit from the payment.43 "A gift 
in the statutory sense, on the other hand, proceeds from a 'detached and 
disinterested generosity,'44 ••• 'out of affection, respect, admiration, charity 
or like impulses.' "45 What controls is the intention with which payment is 
made. "[T]he proper criterion .•. is one that inquires what the basic reason 
for his conduct was in fact-the dominant reason that explains his action 
in making the transfer."46 
With respect to the scope of appellate review, the opinion of the Court 
accepted the position of the dissent in Bogardus, holding that the gift-
income question is basically one of fact to be determined on a case-by-case 
basis.47 The Court's opinion pointed out that in cases decided by a properly 
instructed jury, appellate review is limited to determining whether or not 
reasonable men could differ, and in cases tried by a judge without a jury, 
the judge's findings must stand unless "clearly erroneous.''48 
III. THE PosT-DunERSTEIN PERIOD 
In widow payment cases decided since the Supreme Court's decision in 
Duberstein, the district courts have continued to rule in favor of the tax-
payer widow.49 The Tax Court, on the other hand, has changed its position 
and has ruled in favor of the Commissioner in every one of the fourteen 
post-Duberstein cases it has heard.50 
41 Id. at 285. 
42 Id at 285, quoting Bogardus v. Commissioner, 302 U.S. 34, 41 (1937). 
43 Id. at 285. 
H Id. at 285, quoting Commissioner v. LoBue, 351 U.S. 243, 246 (1956). 
45 Id. at 285, quoting Robertson v. United States, 343 U.S. 711, 714 (1952). 
40 Id. at 286. 
47 Id. at 289-90. 
48 Id. at 290-91. FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a). "Findings of fact shall not be set aside unless 
clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to 
judge of the credibility of the witnesses." 
40 Schleyer v. United States, 12 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 5005 (E.D. Mo. 1963); Peters v. 
United States, 11 Am. Fed. Tax. R.2d 1694 (D. Minn. 1963); Corasaniti v. United States, 
212 F. Supp. 229 (D. Md. 1962); Hine v. Tomlinson, 11 Am. Fed. Tax. R.2d 315 (M.D. Fla. 
1962); Taylor v. United States, 10 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 6059 (E.D. Tenn. 1962); Pixton v. 
United States, IO Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 5578 (S.D. Ala. 1962); Canning v. United States, IO 
Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 5068 (N.D. Tex. 1962); Palmer v. Mathis, 10 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 5248 
(E.D. Ark. 1962); Schwarz v. United States, IO Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 5429 (N.D. Tex. 1962); 
Vaughn v. United States, IO Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 5551 (S.D. Ga. 1962); Rice v. United 
States, 197 F. Supp. 223 (E.D. Wis. 1961); Wilner v. United States, 195 F. Supp. 786 (S.D.N.Y. 
1961) (cross-motions for summary judgment denied); Frankel v. United States, 192 F. Supp. 
776 (D. Minn. 1961), afj'd, 302 F.2d 666 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 903 (1962); Cowan 
v. United States, 191 F. Supp. 703 (N.D. Ga. 1960). Contra, Froehlinger v. United States, 
217 F. Supp. 13 (D. Md. 1963); Browne v. United States, 63-2 U.S. Tax Cas. ,i 9696 (D. Mass. 
1963); Hein v. United States, 9 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 1749 (E.D. Wis. 1962); Gaugler v. 
United States, 204 F. Supp. 493 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), afj'd, 312 F.2d 681 (2d Cir. 1963). 
ISO Estate of James Doumakes, 32 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1416 (1963); Lucile McCrea Evans, 
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The Tax Court's radical change of position is based upon its interpreta-
tion of Duberstein. Despite the express rejection of the Government's new 
test, the Tax Court has felt that the Duberstein opinion represents a new 
development in gift-income law rather than a mere restatement of existing 
law.51 Prior to Duberstein, all the lower courts had decided widow payment 
cases by considering the five factors which the Tax Court had cited as 
controlling in Hellstrom52 and by relying upon decisions in cases that 
were factually similar. Since Duberstein, the Tax Court has felt that 
lower court opinions handed down prior to Duberstein are no longer of 
value as authority. Instead, the Tax Court considers each case as it arises 
by examining its particular facts in light of the general principles laid down 
in Duberstein.53 In doing so, the court has tightened its interpretation of 
the original five-factor test and has broadened its factual inquiry to include 
such factors as the wording of the resolution, the widow's financial situa-
tion, and the transferor's knowledge thereof.54 
Typical of the Tax Court's new approach was its decision in the case 
of Mildred W. Smith.65 In that case, the petitioner's husband had been a 
director and employee of a corporation for thirty-five years and had served 
as its vice-president and treasurer for twenty-three years. Shortly after his 
death, the corporation's board of directors adopted a memorial resolution 
and authorized the payment of certain sums to his widow. The Tax Court 
classified the payments as additional compensation in recognition of past 
services and entered judgment for the Commissioner. The court's opinion 
indicated that it did not find an intent to make a gift because the board of 
directors did not give consideration to the widow's financial situation. The 
board knew that the widow's income had been reduced by the death of her 
husband but, evidently, the Tax Court was reluctant to find a gift in a 
39 T.C. 570 (1962); Estate of Louis Rosen, 31 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 359 (1962); Margaret H. D. 
Penick, 37 T.C. 999 (1962); Mary C. Westphal, 37 T.C. 340 (1961); Estate of Julius B. 
Cronheim, 30 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1249 (1961); Roy I. Martin, 35 T.C. 556 (1961), aff'd, 
305 F.2d 290 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 904 (1962); Estate of W. R. Olsen, 30 P-H Tax 
Ct. Mem. 882 (1961), rev'd, 302 F.2d 671 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 903 (1962); Mildred 
W. Smith, 30 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 848 (1961), afj'd, 305 F.2d 778 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 371 
U.S. 904 (1962); Estate of Irving B. Cooper, 30 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 847 (1961); Mary Fischer, 
30 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 340 (1961); Estate of Rose A. Russek, 30 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 131 
(1961); Estate of Martin Kuntz, Sr., 29 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1531 (1960), rev'd, 300 F.2d 849 
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 903 (1962); Estate of Mervin G. Pierpont, 35 T.C. 65 (1960), 
vacated and remanded sub nom. Poyner v. Commissioner, 301 F.2d 287 (4th Cir. 1962). The 
Court of Claims has heard one case. Carson v. United States, 317 F.2d 370 (Ct. Cl. 1963) 
(income). 
51 Estate of Mervin G. Pierpont, supra note 50, at 67. 
62 See text accompanying note 19 supra. 
53 Estate of Mervin G. Pierpont, 35 T.C. 65, 69 (1960), vacated and remanded sub nom. 
Poyner v. Commissioner, 301 F.2d 287 (4th Cir. 1962). 
54 See Mildred W. Smith, 30 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 848 (1961), afj'd, 305 F.2d 778 (lid 
Cir.), cert denied, 371 U.S. 904 (1962); Estate of Rose A. Russek, 30 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 131 
(1961); Estate of Mervin G. Pierpont, supra note 53 (heavy reliance upon wording of 
resolution). 
55 Mildred W. Smith, supra note 54. 
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case in which the transferor was not aware of the widow's capital resources 
and independent sources of income.116 
If the Smith case had arisen in one of the district courts which had heard 
a widow payment case, it is quite likely that the result would have been 
different. Factually, the case was similar to numerous pre-Duberstein cases 
which had been decided in the taxpayer's favor. Since the district courts 
have interpreted Duberstein as reaffirming rather than changing gift-income 
law,117 there is no reason to believe that any of these district courts would 
have decided this case in the Commissioner's favor. 
Since the Tax Court has changed its position and since it has not 
found a gift in any of the fourteen post-Duberstein cases before it, it is 
not possible to determine the facts that the court would require in order 
to establish a gift. The Smith case indicates that the transferor must be 
aware of the widow's financial situation. Several other recent cases indicate 
that, in addition, the court may require a showing of actual financial need 
on the part of the widow.118 If in fact the Tax Court does require such a 
showing, it would be even more difficult for the widow to prevail. 
With the district courts and the Tax Court reaching different results in 
factually similar cases, the crucial element in most widow payment cases is 
the choice of forum. If the widow pays the deficiency assessed by the Com-
missioner, she may sue for a refund in a district court,119 and a judgment 
in her favor is quite likely. If, on the other hand, the widow does not pay 
the deficiency, the case is heard in the Tax Court60 and the widow's chances 
of success virtually disappear. It would seem that the circuit courts should 
remedy this unsatisfactory situation. However, as a result of the Supreme 
Court's ruling that the determination of gift or income is a factual deter-
mination subject to limited review,61 the circuit courts are placed in a 
position in which they can resolve the conflict only by holding that the 
factual inferences drawn by the Tax Court or the district courts are clearly 
erroneous. 
Since the Duberstein decision, eight widow payment cases have been 
decided by the circuit courts.62 Unfortunately, instead of resolving the con-
11a Id. at 853. 
117 See Frankel v. United States, 192 F. Supp. 776, 778 (D. Minn. 1961), aff'd, 302 F.2d 
666 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 903 (1962). 
118 See Lucile McCrea Evans, 39 T.C. 570, 579 (1962); Estate of Louis Rosen, 31 P-H 
Tax Ct. Mem. 359, 363 (1962); Margaret H. D. Penick, 37 T.C. 999, 1005 (1962). This 
test would add another element of uncertainty by requiring the court to define the term 
"needy." Would a widow accustomed to living on an income of $100,000 a year be con-
sidered "needy" if her income were reduced to $20,000 a year due to her husband's death? 
110 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(l) (1958). 
60 INT. REv. CoDE OF 1954, § 7442; see Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 272(a). 
61 Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 290 (1960). 
62 Gaugler v. United States, 312 F.2d 681 (2d Cir. 1963); Martin v. Commissioner, 305 
F.2d 290 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 904 (1962); Smith v. Commissioner, 305 F.2d 778 
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 904 (1962); United States v. Frankel, 302 F.2d 666 (8th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 371 U.S. 903 (1962); Estate of Olsen v. Commissioner, 302 F.2d 671 (8th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 371 U.S. 903 (1962); Estate of Kuntz v. Commissioner, 300 F.2d 849 (6th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 371 U.S. 903 (1962); Poyner v. Commissioner, 301 F.2d 287 (4th Cir. 1962); 
United States v. Kasynski, 284 F.2d 143 (10th Cir. 1960). 
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flict, these cases have resulted in a split among the circuits.63 As the situation 
stands today, 'six circuits seem uncommitted,64 two have resolved the conflict 
in favor of the district courts' approach,65 and two seem to feel that it is not 
within their power to resolve the conflict because they feel that in most 
cases conflicting inferences are possible and that lower court decisions 
should be affirmed.66 
Of the six uncommitted circuits, only two have actually heard a case. 
In Poyner v. Commissioner,61 the Fourth Circuit vacated a Tax Court 
judgment in favor of the Commissioner and remanded. However, the opin-
ion indicated neither approval nor disapproval of the Tax Court's new 
position.68 The stipulation of facts was made prior to the Supreme Court's 
decision in Duberstein, and, recognizing that the Tax Court had broadened 
its factual inquiry after Duberstein, the court decided that the widow 
should be given an opportunity to amplify the record. In United States v. 
Kasynski,69 the Tenth Circuit affirmed a Colorado district court judgment 
in favor of the widow. Although the court held that the finding of an intent 
to make a gift was a reasonable inference from the facts, it did not indicate 
whether a lower court finding of taxable income would have been clearly 
erroneous and subject to reversal.70 
In cases heard on appeal in the Eighth Circuit, the conflict between the 
Tax Court's approach and that of the district courts has been resolved in 
favor of the district courts' position. A Tax Court decision for the Com-
missioner was reversed in Estate of Olsen v. Commissioner,11 and a judg-
ment for a taxpayer rendered by a district court in Minnesota was affirmed 
in United States v. Frankel.12 In the Olsen case, the Eighth Circuit found 
that the Tax Court's decision was clearly erroneous even though the factual 
setting was quite typical. 
The Sixth Circuit has also resolved the conflict in favor of the district 
courts' position. In Estate of Kuntz v. Commissioner,13 it reversed a Tax 
Court judgment for the Commissioner, holding that the judgment was 
63 In cases involving a purely factual determination, one hesitates to suggest that 
there is a "conflict" or a "split" among the courts. However, in the situation under con-
sideration use of the terms "conflict" and "split" seems proper because the same evidence 
is being treated differently by different courts. 
64 The First, Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits. 
65 The Sixth and Eighth Circuits. 
66 The Second and Third Circuits. 
67 301 F.2d 287 (4th Cir. 1962). 
68 See id. at 292: "The Supreme Court in Duberstein did not destroy the authority of 
the earlier Tax Court cases and the guides enunciated in them for discovering motivation. 
The plea addressed by the Government to the Supreme Court in Duberstein to establish 
a new test defining 'gift' was expressly rejected ..•• On the other hand, Duberstein cannot 
be read as limiting inquiry by the trier of fact solely to the factors recognized by the 
earlier decisions." 
69 284 F.2d 143 (10th Cir. 1960). 
70 See id. at 146. 
71 302 F.2d 671 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 903 (1962). 
72 302 F.2d 666 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 903 (1962). 
73 300 F.2d 849 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 903 (1962). 
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clearly erroneous because a finding of gift was the only reasonable inference 
that could be drawn from the facts.74 The Kuntz case clearly indicated that 
the Sixth Circuit did not approve of the post-Duberstein decisions of the 
Tax Court. In Kuntz, the facts seemed to indicate income rather than gift: 
(1) the payments to the widow were deducted as a salary expense by the 
corporation, (2) the resolution authorizing the payments was phrased in 
terms of -additional compensation in consideration of services rendered, 
and (3) the resolution indicated that the payments were being made in the 
best interests of and to benefit the corporation.711 Despite the testimony of 
two directors that a gift was intended, the case for the Commissioner re-
mained a very strong one. The Sixth Circuit's reversal indicates that it 
probably would reverse every post-Duberstein Tax Court decision. This 
position seems stronger than that taken by the Eight Circuit. The latter 
would find most post-Duberstein Tax Court findings clearly erroneous, but 
it might not reverse in cases with facts strongly favoring a finding of income. 
The Second and Third Circuits, in deciding Gaugler v. United States,76 
Martin v. Commissioner,77 and Smith v. Commissioner,78 have taken the 
position that in the typical widow payment case, conflicting factual in-
ferences are possible and lower court decisions of either gift or income 
should be affirmed. In each of the cases, a lower court decision in favor of 
the Commissioner was affirmed, but in none of them was there any indica-
tion that the court agreed with the inferences drawn by the trier of fact. 
However, each of the opinions did make it clear that the appellate court's 
function was quite limited and that it could not reverse simply because 
there was room for reasonable difference of opinion. In addition, both the 
Second and the Third Circuits intimated that the Sixth and Eighth Circuits 
had exceeded their powers in reversing Olsen and Kuntz.79 
IV. THE PROBLEM AND ITS SOLUTION 
Despite the welter of cases, two basic problems remain. The first of 
these is the determinative role played by the choice of forum. In factually 
similar cases, the widow's success or lack thereof depends almost entirely 
upon whether the action is brought in a district court or the Tax Court. 
Thus far, there is little indication that the circuit courts can or will re-
solve this situation. The second problem is one that has plagued the Com-
missioner for decades. With a good deal of justification, he has sought to 
tax these transactions at one end or the other. As the law stands today, 
however, it is quite possible that the corporation will be allowed to deduct 
U Id. at 852. 
711 Estate of Martin Kuntz, Sr., 29 P-H Tax Ct. Mero. 1531-32 (1960), rev'd, 300 F.2d 
849 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 903 (1962). 
76 312 F.2d 681 (2d Cir. 1963). 
77 305 F.2d 290 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 904 (1962). 
78 305 F.2d 778 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 904 (1962). 
79 See Gaugler v. United States, 312 F.2d 681, 686 (2d Cir. 1963); Smith v. Commis-
sioner, 305 F.2d 778, 782 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 904 (1962). 
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the payment and the widow will not have to include it in her gross income. 
On the other hand, it is conceivable, though less likely, that in two separate 
actions, one court would disallow the corporation's deduction and another 
would hold that the payment was income to the widow. While taxation at 
both ends would be less disturbing to the Commissioner, it seems just as 
unreasonable as failure to tax either the widow or the corporation. 
Prior to Duberstein, there was always the hope that the Supreme Court 
would help resolve the first of these problems. It could have granted cer-
tiorari in a widow payment case and established a workable definition of 
the term "gift," one that :would have provided a formula based upon spe-
cific factual elements rather than intent. Such a formula would have served 
as a clear guide for the lower courts. Instead, in Duberstein, the Court made 
it quite clear that promulgation of such a formula is within the province 
of the legislative rather than the judicial function.80 It pointed out that 
under the present statutory framework, the gift-income problem does not 
lend itself to a definitive statement that can be mechanically applied to 
resolve a variety of cases.81 Instead, the Court felt that the question was 
basically one of fact which had to be determined on a case-by-case basis. It 
realized that such an approach would lead to uncertainty and litigation, but 
it apparently did not realize that such a wide divergence would develop be-
tween the Tax Court on the one hand and the district courts on the other.82 
However, denial of certiorari in five cases83 involving payments to widows 
indicates that the Court still feels that if the lower coarts are to be given 
more definite guidance, it must come from Congress. 
Three recent district court decisions84 indicate that the district courts 
may be gradually adopting the Tax Court's view. Prior to Duberstein, it was 
immaterial whether reference was made to the Hellstrom five-factor test, 
precedent, or both, because all led to the same result, inasmuch as both Tax 
Court and district court precedents were based upon the five-factor test. 
After Duberstein, the Tax Court approach differed from that of the district 
courts, with the result that post-Duberstein lower court cases offered con-
flicting precedents. The three district court cases, described below, indicate 
80 Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 290 (1960). 
81 Id. at 284-85. 
82 Id. at 290: "Doubtless diversity of result will tend to be lessened somewhat since 
federal income tax decisions, even those in tribunals of first instance turning on issues of 
fact, tend to be reported, and since there may be a natural tendency of professional triers 
of fact to follow one another's determinations, even as to factual matters." 
83 Commissioner v. Estate of Olsen, 371 U.S. 903 (1962); Commissioner v. Kuntz, 371 
U.S. 903 (1962); Martin v. Commissioner, 371 U.S. 904 (1962); Smith v. Commissioner, 371 
U.S. 904 (1962); United States v. Frankel, 371 U.S. 903 (1962). 
84 Froehlinger v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 13 (D. Md. 1963); Browne v. United 
States, 63-2 U.S. Tax Cas. ,r 9696 (D. Mass. 1963); Gaugler v. United States, 204 F. Supp. 
493 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), afj'd, 312 F.2d 681 (2d Cir. 1963). In Hein v. United States, 9 Am. Fed. 
Tax R.2d 1749 (E.D. Wis. 1962), the only other post-Duberstein district court case to be 
decided against the widow, the opinion did not indicate that the court was departing from 
the pre-Duberstein district court approach. 
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a willingness to accept Tax Court precedent and to rely upon the additional 
factors which the Tax Court has been considering since Duberstein. 
In Browne v. United States,85 which was decided in the Commissioner's 
favor, the charge to the jury indicated that the Massachusetts District Court 
had been influenced by recent Tax Court opinions. Included in the factors 
which the jury was instructed to consider were the wording of the resolu-
tion, the accounting and tax treatment of the payments by the corporation, 
the failure of the corporation to investigate the widow's financial circum-
stances, and the actual financial status of the widow at the time of her hus-
band's death.86 In Froehlinger v. United States81 and Gaugler v. United 
States,88 also decided in favor of the Commissioner, the evidence indicated 
that the payments were motivated by anticipated economic benefit to the 
corporation and by a moral obligation arising from similar payments to 
other widows. However, despite the fact that the decisions might have been 
the same if the courts' inquiry had been limited to the five factors cited in 
Hellstrom, both opinions indicate that their factual inquiries were not 
so limited. In support of their conclusions, these courts referred to, among 
other things, the wording of the resolution, the way the payments were 
treated on the books of the corporation, and the failure to investigate the 
financial circumstances and needs of the widow.89 
If these three cases mark the beginning of a trend, the district courts 
may gradually adopt the Tax Court's position, thus both the problem of 
"forum shopping" and that of possible tax-free treatment at both ends of 
the transaction will be eliminated. Such a trend would appear to be little 
more than a remote possibility and even if it were to develop, it would re-
quire an appreciable period of time. 
Since the Supreme Court will not resolve the problem and since solution 
by the lower courts is unlikely, the only recourse seems to be Congress. 
Legislative action could take any of several forms. Congress could amend 
the Code to provide substantially as follows: 
I. The transferor may deduct the payment at his option. 
2. At the time of the transfer, the transferor must inform the recipient 
as to whether it is deducting the payment. 
3. Payments not deducted by the transferor are excludable by the re-
cipient. Payments deducted by the transferor are to be included in 
the recipient's gross income. 
Such an amendment would eliminate the problems of "forum shopping" 
and tax-free treatment at both ends of the transaction, but it would create 
a situation in which some widows would receive more favorable tax treat-
85 Note 84 supra. 
86 Browne v. United States, 63·2 U.S. Tax Cas. 1J 9696, at 89782-83 (D. Mass. 1963). 
87 217 F. Supp. 13 (D. Md. 1963). 
88 204 F. Supp. 493 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), aff'd, 312 F.2d 681 (2d Cir. 1963). 
so Froehlinger v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 13, 17 (D. Md. 1963); Gaugler v. United 
States, 204 F. Supp. 493, 500-01 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), affd, 312 F.2d 681 (2d Cir. 1963). 
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ment than others. In cases in which the corporation and the widow deal 
at arm's length, it does not seem objectionable to permit the corporation to 
determine the extent of its generosity by having the option of making a 
taxable or non-taxable payment. However, in cases in which a closely held 
corporation and a widow do not deal at arm's length, legislation of this 
type would tend to establish the corporate tax rate as the maximum rate 
applicable to these transactions because closely held corporations would be 
likely to forego a deduction if the marginal rate applicable to the widow's 
income is greater than the rate applicable to the corporation's earnings. 
Thus, in the setting of a closely held corporation, the desirability of this 
type of legislation seems questionable because it would provide widows in 
the higher tax brackets with disproportionate tax savings. 
A second possibility would be promulgation of a set of specific factual 
elements similar to those now considered by the lower courts, with the re-
quirement that the widow include the payments in her gross income unless 
these elements are present. Legislation of this type would undoubtedly re-
solve the differences among the lower courts and would eliminate the 
"forum shopping" problem. However, since such legislation would be di-
rected only at the widow, it would not eliminate the possibility, in any 
given case, of tax-free treatment at both ends of the transaction. Even if the 
congressional test is so framed as to provide additional impetus to a finding 
of income, such a test would be particularly amenable to circumvention and 
would not significantly reduce a corporation's ability to make a tax-free 
gift. Tax-free treatment at both ends could be avoided by allowing the cor-
poration to deduct only in cases in which the widow is taxed, but by so 
limiting the corporation's deduction, this legislative possibility would be 
reduced to a mere variation of the option plan discussed in the preceding 
paragraph. 
A third possibility would be to amend section lOl(b)'s exclusion of a 
stated amount, now 5,000 dollars, to require also the inclusion of payments 
received above the stated amount. Such an approach would eliminate un-
certainty and litigation but, standing alone, would not remove the possibil-
ity of taxation at both ends of the transaction. To eliminate this possibility, 
Congress could link deductibility and excludability by limiting the cor-
poration's deduction to that part of the payment which the widow must 
include in her gross income. 
In the opinion of this writer, the last proposal seems best. Permitting the 
corporation to deduct when the widow is not required to include the pay-
ment in her gross income creates an unnecessary loophole. If the payment 
is motivated by business reasons and is in reality a continuation of the 
decedent's salary, the corporation should be allowed to deduct, but the pay-
ment should be included in the widow's gross income. On the other hand, 
if the payment is motivated by generosity, affection, charity, or like im-
pulses, the recipient should not be taxed and the corporation should not 
be permitted to take a deduction. Originally, gifts were excluded from 
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gross income because it was felt that it would be more appropriate to tax 
them separately by means of a gift tax and to tax the donor rather than the 
recipient. Thus, as originally conceived, the gift exclusion was not designed 
to immunize gift transactions from all forms of taxation. Since the gift tax 
is not applicable to corporations, if complete immunity is to be avoided, 
the corporation must not be permitted a deduction in cases in which pay-
ments are motivated by generosity and are not included in the widow's 
gross income. In most widow payment cases, it is difficult to characterize 
the payment. Some factors indicate that it is made for business purposes 
and is analogous to a salary payment which should be included in gross in-
come. Other factors indicate that the payment is motivated by generosity 
or like impulses and that it is analogous to an excludable gift. Therefore, 
it seems best to compromise by permitting the widow to exclude only those 
payments received up to a stated amount and by allowing the corporation 
to take a deduction for those payments which the widow must include in 
her gross income. 
As presently interpreted, the Code provides a possible loophole for both 
corporations and widows of corporate executives. The different approaches 
taken by the courts and the subjective tests used to distinguish gifts from 
income lead to confusion, uncertainty, and a great deal of litigation. The 
absence of any significant propensity on the part of the courts to even as 
much as acknowledge a duty to resolve these difficulties would seem to belie 
the possibility of a judicial solution. If a solution is to be found in the near 
future, it would seem that the initiative must be taken by Congress. Several 
legislative solutions are available. Each has its drawbacks, but each seems 
preferable to the current confusion and uncertainty. 
Paul A. Rothman 
